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(24 March 1977)

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR

PRM/NSC-10: NET ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

1. PROBLEM

-- review and analyze past, present and possible future trends in U.S. and Soviet intelligence collection capabilities against worldwide targets;

-- analyze Soviet objectives and strategies regarding the collection of intelligence; and

-- develop and make recommendations concerning alternative national objectives and strategies for the U.S. in the area of intelligence collection.

The specific questions which will be addressed are attached.

These questions may be modified or supplemented by the SCC and/or the SCC's Net Assessment Working Group.

2. TASK FORCE

-- To accomplish this assessment, a DCI/IC Staff task force will be formed under the direction of [REDACTED] Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement (OPEI). Its members will consist of personnel drawn from each OPEI Division (HUMINT, SIGINT, Imagery, and Production Assessment and Improvement). 25X1A

The OSD point of contact will be [REDACTED] DIA, who will arrange for appropriate DoD participation. Representatives from other agencies and offices will participate in the task force as required. 25X1A

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-- The task force will develop responses to each question as it applies to each intelligence collection discipline, for subsequent melding by the task force coordinator.

-- Responses will be based on contributions from appropriate Community elements (i.e., CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI) obtained via informal liaison or other separate tasking, or as submitted by other elements' initiative.

3. GENERAL GUIDANCE TO TASK FORCE

-- use presently available source material to the maximum extent;

-- develop relevant charts/tables to illustrate comparative capabilities, but place emphasis on a narrative discussion of the issues;

-- limit the scope to US-USSR comparisons, except where it is necessary to go beyond in order to be most meaningful (e.g., Soviet surrogate HUMINT intelligence services in East Europe);

-- discuss US-USSR collection capabilities both as they apply worldwide and where significant regional variations exist;

-- highlight differing US and Soviet needs for intelligence vis-a-vis evolving capabilities wherever possible;

-- concentrate on national collection systems and assets;

-- exclude analysis of (1) NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons; (2) tactical collection assets; and (3) intelligence information processing/exploitation capabilities and issues such as C³, I&W ADP, fusion centers, etc. (but include, where appropriate, a

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discussion of evolving U.S. capabilities for intelligence analysis and production);

-- draw on other PRM-10 regional and topical assessments as the basis for developing alternative national intelligence strategies; and

-- don't worry about classification, although this may become a problem later on.

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4. REPORTS. The following will be provided to [REDACTED] DCI's representative to the SCC's Net Assessment Working Group:

- a detailed outline/status report by 1 April
- a preliminary report by 1 May
- a final report by 15 May.

Attachment:

Questions to be Addressed

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Attachment to Terms
of Reference for
PRM/NSC-10

ATTACHMENT

INTELLIGENCE NET ASSESSMENT

What have been the most significant trends in the evolution of the relative intelligence collection capabilities of the U.S. and USSR over the last 15 years?

-- What evidence is there of any changes in Soviet collection practices or Soviet reactions to U.S. collection activities in the period since the initiation of detente (1971-1972)?

-- What is the significance of any such Soviet changes or reactions?

What is the present situation with respect to relative U.S. and Soviet intelligence capabilities?

-- What are the most important gaps in U.S. intelligence on the USSR? In Soviet intelligence on the U.S.?

-- How has the asymmetry in U.S. and Soviet access to information on the other affected U.S. and Soviet intelligence?

-- What degree of coverage do we have of Soviet R&D programs?

-- What is the U.S. capability to verify present and possible future strategic arms limitation agreements?

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-- What is the U.S. capability for intelligence analysis and production on major Soviet-related issues? How do the Soviets appraise U.S. intelligence capabilities and objectives? How do they estimate their own strengths and weaknesses?

What are the recent, current and most probable future Soviet intelligence objectives and strategies? What threats do they pose to U.S. national interests? Where is the U.S. most vulnerable?

-- What are the Soviets capable of doing (or what will they be capable of) that they are not doing now to frustrate U.S. surveillance (1) within the bounds of the SALT I treaty provisions against interference with national technical means of verification; (2) in the event those treaty provisions lapse or are abrogated; and (3) with what cost to them in resources or interference with their own effectiveness or efficiency?

What factors are most likely to determine the evolution of U.S. and Soviet intelligence collection capabilities during the next 5-10 years?

-- What U.S. and Soviet innovations and/or countermeasures could significantly change the range of intelligence available from technical sensors (COMINT, ELINT, satellite surveillance)? What are the prospects for achieving these innovations/countermeasures?

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-- What are the long-range trends and implications for U.S. and Soviet intelligence collection of overseas base rights problems?

-- What would be the net consequences of more/less reliance on human sources? In which regions and on what topics would a decline in HUMINT be most damaging?

What alternative national strategies for intelligence collection might the U.S. pursue, and what are their costs, risks, and benefits?

What would be the probable impact of these alternative U.S. national strategies on the relative capabilities of the U.S. and USSR over the next ten years and on the ability of the U.S. to achieve its national objectives?

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When circled - cy has been furnished.

Please ensure that
OPP and its effort to
build "intelligence strategy" are
properly cilt into PRM 10.
We shall have to talk on
what a "strategy" is.

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